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POLICE AND GOVERNMENT
The Governance of the Police. By Laurence Lustgarten. London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986.
REVIYED By PHILIP STENNING*
When all is said and done, there is -not a great deal that is
truly new in Mr. Lustgarten's examination of the issues surrounding
the governance of the police in England and Wales (Scotland and
Northern Ireland are excluded from his attention). Indeed, his
candid acknowledgement throughout this excellent book of his
reliance on the work of others who have toiled in this remarkably
cultivated field of scholarship, is as welcome as it is refreshing.
Despite the fact that it treads so much well-worn ground, however,
this book can undoubtedly now be recognized as the best and most
comprehensive analysis of these important issues currently available.
As such, it deserves (and will amply reward) careful attention.
The main theme of The Governance of the Police,1 which
permeates the entire book, is that the distinctiveness which the
exponents of "police independence" (be they policemen, judges,
politicians or academics) have claimed for the problem of police
governance - as compared to other public services which have a
hybrid national-local character - has been, and continues to be,
grossly exaggerated, at least throughout most of the twentieth
century. Central to this analysis is the contention (entirely correct
in this reviewer's opinion) that the argument that policing decisions
have their source exclusively in "the law" and not in policy, is, and
always has been, untenable both theoretically and empirically. It is
an argument which Mr. Lustgarten ably demolishes with a barrage
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of historical, legal, constitutional, political, and to a lesser extent
empirical, analysis, culminating in the last chapter of the book,
which, in terms at least of the preceding academic and policy
literature on the governance of the police in Britain, is as radical as
it is powerful. In it, he argues that the way of "democratic
constitutionalism" demands that the main pillars of the infamous
doctrine of "police independence" (according to which virtually all of
the important policy and operational decisions of the police should
be immune from effective political scrutiny, let alone control) should
be swept away and the principal political responsibility for the
democratic control of policing should be returned (for historically
this would be the right word) to the hands of locally elected (and
accountable) authorities (although he omits to mention exactly what
the composition and status of such authorities - "organs of local
government" - should be).
The role of central government in the governance of the
police would be confined to promulgating and insisting upon the
observance by local police forces and their authorities of minimum
standards of technical competence and of respect for fundamental
human rights and civil liberties, and the establishment and
administration of certain necessary "national" police services,
including a genuinely independent and effective body to hear and
dispose of the more serious public complaints against the police.
This central government influence would be exerted principally, as
now, through the leverage of central government subsidy of local
policing expenditures, administered through Her Majesty's
Inspectorate of Constabulary.
As for the courts, Lustgarten urges that they should continue
to exercise great restraint in intervening in areas of police policy,
and should confine themselves to the usual areas of judicial review,
treating the police no differently from other public servants. As he
indicates, there is some evidence that the English courts are already
moving in this direction.
2
The essence of Lustgarten's reform proposals is that the
current, largely unaccountable hegemony which Chief Constables,
(there seems to be some disagreement as to whether it is more or
2 See Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke, [1984] A.C. 437 (House of Lords).
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less) in concert with the Home Office, exert over police policy and
operational decision-making, should be broken in favour of genuine
democratic local control in this area. While his argument in favour
of reform, which builds throughout the book, is solid and persuasive
enough, however, his articulation and justification of the new
structures and protocols of police governance which he recommends
are confined to the last chapter of the book and are disappointingly
sketchy. Given that, in the context of what exists now, they are so
radical and will undoubtedly evoke a very negative reaction from the
current police policy "establishment," this failure to specify and justify
them more carefully may turn out to be a fatal weakness of the
book. Lustgarten's cursory discussion of how genuinely national, as
opposed to local, policing needs are to be defined and met under
the reforms he proposes is particularly disappointing. For while his
preference for local control and accountability understandably leads
him to recommend a transfer of governance of the Metropolitan
London force from the Home Secretary to a more locally-based (but
unspecified) elected authority,3 his glib suggestion that the "national
functions now performed by the Metropolitan Police" should simply
be turned over to the Inspectorate of Constabulary, responsible to
a Ministry of Justice, is scarcely an adequate disposition of this issue,
and leaves the reader with the uncomfortable feeling that Lustgarten
does not really understand (or has not bothered to properly think
through) the implications of his recommendations.
As this reviewer has learned from his own experience of this
phenomenon in Canada, 4 police, judicial and government policy-
makers have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to simply ignore or
discredit any argument, however well articulated, which seeks to
debunk the current mythology of "police independence" or disturb
current arrangements for police governance. Indeed, Lustgarten
himself acknowledges this reality when he laments that "in terms of
practical effect on political and judicial elites," Geoffrey Marshall's
excellent treatment of the subject in his book Police and Government
3 Supra, note 1 at 179.
4 P. Stenning, Legal Status of the Police (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985).
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(1965),5 written more than 20 years earlier, "might as well never
have been written."6  The possibility that someone will be saying
something similar about Lustgarten's book in twenty years' time (or
less) is all too real.
One area of Lustgarten's analysis which appears particularly
weak, but is very important, is his treatment of the situation of the
individual constable making discretionary decisions in individual cases.
Lustgarten seems to vacillate on this issue. At one point, referring
to the notorious predicament of Constable Joy in Kent, he states
that the primary lesson to be learned from this case is "how tightly
the constable's wings are clipped by the structure within which he
works. P.C. Joy's superiors were able to substitute their discretion
for his."7 Only two pages later, however, he asserts as "a matter of
vital importance for police governance" the fact that "no superior
officer can take away the discretion granted to the individual
constable by statute, either by requiring him to arrest, or forbidding
him to arrest, a particular individual or anyone vho falls into some
predefined category," referring to this as the essence of a constable's
independence "in the sense of freedom from interference in the
exercise of that discretion."
8
To this reviewer, the distinction between telling a subordinate
officer not to arrest someone (which senior officers apparently
cannot do) and substituting their own discretion for his after an
arrest has been made (which apparently they can, and do, do) seems
rather too fine to be persuasive. In the end, Lustgarten comes out
in favour of a constable's independence in this regard, justifying it
in the following terms:
Only the constable personally aware of the facts can form the reasonable suspicion
necessary in law for an arrest or search. For any political body, however popularly
representative, to order the arrest of X or non-arrest of Y is - quite apart form the
question of motive - to usurp a power Parliament has allocated elsewhere.9
5G. Marshall, Police and Government (London: Metheun, 1965).
6 Supra, note 1 at 33.
7 ibid. at 12.
8 ibid. at 14.
9 Ibid. at 171.
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This is neither persuasive nor consistent with Lustgarten's analysis
throughout the remainder of the book, however. For his main
argument ( most clearly articulated in Chapter 1 on "Police
Discretion") is that any law enforcement decision, whether at the
level of general policy or with respect to an individual case, involves
not only legal considerations (are the legal grounds to justify an
arrest satisfied?) but also policy considerations (is this the kind of
case which is best dealt with by invoking the legal process?), and can
therefore be properly regarded as "political" (in a non-partisan
sense). It is difficult to see why the argument that sustains most of
Lustgarten's recommendations (that because law enforcement
decisions are fundamentally political in this sense, they should be
subject to democratic accountability and control) should not apply
equally to the constable's decision with respect to an individual case
as it does, for instance, to his Chief Constable's decisions with
respect to the size or deployment of a particular squad. Further, to
suggest that the constable's decision should not be subject to
democratic accountability and control because the power to make it
has been conferred on him by Parliament, seems to beg the very
question Lustgarten is seeking to answer. Clearly he would not
invoke the same argument to support the independence of a Chief
Constable in the exercise of his (equally statutory) responsibilities for
the "direction and control" of his police force. The vital question is
should such statutory powers be exercisable independent of any
democratic accountability and control?
No one suggests that a constable should be liable to be
ordered to make an arrest where the legal criteria for an arrest are
not satisfied. The question, however, is whether, given that the legal
criteria are satisfied in a particular case, anyone (including his
superior officers) should be able to instruct a constable as to
whether he should exercise his power of arrest in that case or not.
The law currently provides no clear answer to this question. In P.C.
Joy's case, it was left essentially unresolved. In a comparable case
in Canada a few years ago, a court relying principally on the
particular wording of the statute, which made the sergeant concerned
"subject to the orders of the Commissioner" in the performance of
his duties, but also invoking the famous dicta of Lord Denning in
1989]
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the first Blackburn case10 in support of its conclusion, upheld a
senior officer's right to order his sergeant to terminate a particular
criminal investigation. 1 Had someone other than a senior officer
been trying to direct Sergeant Wool to cease his investigation,
however, it is quite possible that the court would have taken a very
different view of the matter.
As Lustgarten has rightly argued, the question of whether
the individual constable is to be regarded as free from democratic
accountability and control in making law enforcement decisions in
individual cases is critical to the debate over police governance.
This is because of the ease with which police executives can invoke
the "slippery slope" argument, according to which democratic control
over any aspects of law enforcement will inevitably lead in the end
to "improper" interferences in the disposition of individual cases.
However specious this argument may be, it has great popular appeal,
and must be met with a convincing rejoinder by anyone who seeks
to convince the police to yield some of their treasured
independence. Lustgarten's argument in favour of individual
constabulary independence, while it may be strategically wise, is not
very persuasive in this respect, especially since it seems to conflict
with almost everything else he has to say about the nature of police
discretion. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how it can be
reconciled with the realities of police organization and management,
to which he has also drawn attention in his book.
Despite its very real strengths, Lustgarten's book illustrates
well the empirical desert within which the issue of police governance
must still be discussed in Britain. While Lustgarten himself has
made a commendable attempt to supplement the "merely formal
study of the constitutional allocation of power"12 with some empirical
evidence about the way police governance actually works in practice,
even this worthy attempt must ultimately be recognized as
inadequate. The evidence drawn upon is largely anecdotal,
10 R v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn, [19681 1 All E.R. 763
(Court of Appeal).
11 "Supreme and County Court Decisions - Wool v. The Queen and Nixon" (1985-86) 28
Crim. L.Q. 162 (Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division).
12 Supra, note 1 at 100.
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unsystematic and drawn for the most part (understandably) from
highly publicized, often politically charged cases which cannot be
claimed to reflect the day-to-day realities of routine police
governance with any accuracy.
The responsibility for this lack of systematic empirical
information as a base for analysis and the formulation of policy in
this area cannot, of course, be laid at Lustgarten's door. Rather, it
reflects the closed and secretive character of the police and Home
Office establishments which, until very recently, have not shown any
serious willingness or inclination to allow researchers adequate access
to the realities of police governance. Such secretiveness has, of
course, come to be recognized as one of the characteristics of
government more generally in Britain, although other countries of
the Commonwealth are by no means paragons of virtue in this
regard either. Nevertheless, it must be said that authorities in
Canada have permitted a degree of empirical research on the
realities of police governance in that country' 3 without apparently
suffering any disastrous consequences for the police or anyone else.
It must be noted, too, that the more recent work of Morgan and
Swift 4 and Lovedayl 5 in England, despite its obvious limitations,
represents a very welcome sign in this regard.
The results which emerge from such empirical investigations
are not always what one might expect them to be. But that is
another story. The point here is that until the realities of police
governance in Britain can be more adequately revealed, even the
best efforts of authors such as Lustgarten to advance rational public
policy in this area must be regarded as inadequate, and will be all
too easily discredited by their opponents.
13 See, for example, P. Stenning, Police Commissions and Boards in Canada (Toronto:
Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1981), and R.G. Hann et al., "Municipal Police
Governance and Accountability in Canada: An Empirical Study" (1985) 9 Canadian Police
College Journal 1.
14 R. Morgan & P. Swift, 'The Future of Police Authorities: Members' Views" (1987) 65
Pub. Admin. 259.
15 B. Loveday, The Role and Defectiveness of the Merseyside Police Cormnittee (Liverpool:
Merseyside Police Committee, 1985), and "Progress of the Joint Boards" (1987) 3 Policing
196.
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Despite such reservations, however, Lustgarten's book is a
fine work of scholarship, beautifully and clearly written, which should
be required reading for anyone interested in police governance in
Britain or elsewhere. His description of the impotence of local
police authorities in England is made particularly memorable by his
observation that "if power without responsibility is the prerogative
of the harlot, responsibility without power is the prerogative of the
eunuch.,16 Hopefully, the same will not be true of Lustgarten's
book itself.
16 Supra, note 1 at 125.
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